Copy of Financial Investigation Manual by ECCU (FOI)

​​​​Original ​​​​​Request

The Update on the National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering states at 5.4.7: “Additionally, manuals of Guidance in relation to ML investigations have been published to the LOD by the AG, and both SoJP and ECCU have produced their own Financial Investigation Manual.”

Money Laundering Update.pdf (gov.je)

​Please provide a copy of the Financial Investigation Manual produced by ECCU (i.e. the Economic Crimes and Confiscation Unit).

Original ​Response

The information requested is exempt under Article 27 of the Freedom of Information Jersey (Law) 2011

The Financial Investigation Manual (the “Document”) has been produced by legal advisers within ECCU. The Document being intended to advise its primary audience how best to investigate money laundering and financial crime.

Whilst ECCU is not noted within Article 26A of the FOI Law, it performs a similar function for Jersey to some of the criminal investigative agencies noted therein whose manuals of investigation and other information would be automatically exempt.

It is recognised that the more readily accessible to criminals one can make a detailed understanding of matters such as that covered by the Document, the more likely it is such criminals could use such knowledge to avoid successful investigations (in turn leading to a greater chance of damage and harm occurring to Jersey’s citizens and economy).

What constitutes “national security” is not specifically defined by Jersey, the UK or European law. However, in the English case of Norman Baker v the Information Commissioner and the Cabinet Office (EA/2006/0045 4 April 2007) the Information Tribunal was guided by a House of Lords case, Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47, concerning whether the risk posed by a foreign national provided grounds for his deportation. The Information Tribunal summarised the Lords’ observations as: 

• “national security” means the security of the United Kingdom and its people; 
• the interests of national security are not limited to actions by the individual which are targeted at the UK, its system of government or its people;
• the protection of democracy and the legal and constitutional systems of the state are part of national security as well as military defence;
• action against a foreign state may be capable indirectly of affecting the security of the UK; and,
• reciprocal cooperation between the UK and other states in combating international terrorism is capable of promoting the United Kingdom’s national security. 
• Given the similarities of the Freedom of Information regimes, it is likely that the above definition would be followed in Jersey so that “national security” means the security of the Jersey and its people etc. 

Likewise, ‘required’ (to safeguard national security) has been interpreted as meaning ‘reasonably necessary’. Such approach being informed by the approach taken in the European Court of Human Rights, where the interference of human rights can be justified where it is ‘necessary’ in a democratic society for safeguarding national security. ‘Necessary’ in this context being taken to mean something less than absolutely essential but more than simply being useful or desirable.

There is no requirement to show that disclosing the withheld information would lead to a direct threat, but there must be a real possibility of an adverse effect. (House of Lords case, Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman [2001] UKHL 47). 

Whilst there may be a difference between terrorism and organised crime, it is reasonable and reasonably necessary, to consider both, a threat to Jersey’s national security its people and constitutional systems. 

The Bailiwick of Jersey National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering noting:

“the JFCU-FIU’s intelligence database has been reviewed and relevant cases extracted. These cases suggest that the greatest threat to Jersey comes from non-residents seeking to hide the proceeds of corruption and white-collar crime in Jersey”

 Bodies such as the NCA (National Crime Agency) in the United Kingdom having also considered: 

 “The critical importance of the financial sector to the UK’s economy means that money laundering, particularly high-end money laundering…can threaten the UK’s national security and prosperity and undermine the integrity of the UK’s financial system and international reputation”

 Similarly, the UK has also recently announced that fraud will be reclassified as a national security threat, giving it the same status as terrorism. Please see the link below: 

Fraud to be Reclassified as a UK National Security Threat (complyadvantage.com)

Whilst Article 27 is an absolute exemption and not a qualified exemption it is also noted that maintenance of a degree of confidentiality in respect of the manner in which financial crime may be investigated, is clearly in the interests of the public and that this approach assists the protection of democracy and the legal and constitutional systems of the state.

It is also considered that the Document constitutes legal advice concerning the investigation of financial crime, the privilege in which was not waived when it was provided to the Government Department. 

It is not in the public interest for such legal advice to be available to potential suspects or defendants in financial crime cases, which would occur if the Document was published. Accordingly, the Document is exempt under Article 31 and absolutely exempt under Article 27.

Articles applied

Article 27 - National security 

(1) Information which does not fall within Article 26A(1) is absolutely exempt information if exemption from the obligation to disclose it under this Law is required to safeguard national security. 

(2) Except as provided by paragraph (3), a certificate signed by the Chief Minister certifying that the exemption is required to safeguard national security is conclusive evidence of that fact.

(3) A person aggrieved by the decision of the Chief Minister to issue a certificate under paragraph (2) may appeal to the Royal Court on the grounds that the Chief Minister did not have reasonable grounds for issuing the certificate.

(4) The decision of the Royal Court on the appeal shall be final.

Article 31 - Advice by the Bailiff, Deputy Bailiff or a Law Officer

Information is qualified exempt information if it is or relates to the provision of advice by the Bailiff, Deputy Bailiff or the Attorney General or the Solicitor General.

Public Interest Test 

With regard to the public interest arguments, HM Treasury v IC [2009] EWHC 1811 Blake J recognised that when engaged, the Convention will carry significant weight in the public interest test. The Convention has been considered by the Office of the Information Commissioner and was held to be part of Jersey law.

Whilst it is recognised that the strong public interest in protecting Law Officers’ advice may still be overridden in some cases if there are particularly strong factors in favour of disclosure, conversely, disclosing the advice or whether advice was or will be sought could inhibit the Law Officers from (1) giving frank advice (2) inhibit government bodies in taking advice for fear of its publication; and (3) inhibit the full disclosure to the Law Officers of all material relevant to the advice being sought and therefore real weight ought to be afforded to this aspect of the Law Officers’ Convention.

Disclosing either the legal advice or the fact of whether specific advice was sought to the public is not a greater consideration of public interest that requires disclosure of the advice or confirmation of what advice was given. It does not outweigh the three principles set out above which require the long-standing Law Officer Convention to be maintained. Therefore, the balance is in favour of maintaining the exemption and it is not considered the public interest in disclosure outweighs the preservation of the Convention on this occasion.

​Internal Review Request

Introduction 

The Request seeks a copy of the Financial Investigation Manual (the “Manual”) produced by the Economic Crimes and Confiscation Unit (“ECCU”), which has been shared with (at least) the Government of Jersey. 

The scheduled public authority (the “SPA”) does not deny that it has a copy of the Manual. Rather, the Response claims that the Manual, in its entirety, is exempt from disclosure on two grounds: (a) Article 27 (National Security) of the Freedom of Information (Jersey) Law 2011 (the “FOI Law”); and (b) Article 31 (Advice by the Bailiff, Deputy Bailiff or a Law Officer) of the FOI Law. 

The issue for the requested internal review, therefore, is not whether the SPA has a copy of the requested information in its possession; it does.  The central issue for the Internal Review Panel to determine is whether the SPA was right to withhold the whole of the Manual on the basis of the exemptions specified at Article 27 and Article 31.  For the reasons expanded on below, it is submitted that the Manual should not have been withheld on the basis of either Article 27 or Article 31.  Alternatively, only part (and not the whole) of the Manual should have been withheld. 

Article 26A 

Before considering Article 27, it is necessary to address the Response's reference to Article 26A of the FOI Law.  

Article 26A provides that information is absolutely exempt information if it is held by a scheduled public authority and either or both of the following apply: (a) it was directly or indirectly supplied to the scheduled public authority by any of the bodies specified in paragraph 2 of Article 26A; or (b) it relates to any of those bodies. 

The Response correctly notes that ECCU is not specified in paragraph 2 of Article 26A; the exemption at Article 26A therefore does not apply to information supplied by, or relating to, ECCU. 

The Response then goes on, however, to equate ECCU to the agencies listed in Article 26A, claiming that ECCU “performs a similar function for Jersey to some of the criminal investigative agencies noted therein whose manuals of investigation and other information would be automatically exempt”.  The SPA appears to be attempting to suggest that, because ECCU allegedly performs similar functions for Jersey to some of the UK criminal investigative agencies specified at Article 26A, some sort of presumption that information supplied by ECCU (including the Manual) should be exempt for reasons of national security should be applied.    

The simple answer to this is that ECCU is not specified at Article 26A; if the States intended for information supplied by, or relating to, ECCU (or any Jersey agency) to be automatically exempt, this could have been provided for by an appropriate amendment to the FOI Law. 

The fact that neither ECCU (nor any other Jersey authority) is specified at Article 26A is consistent with the stated purpose of amending the FOI Law to include Article 26A. Article 26A was introduced (pursuant to the Freedom of Information (Exemptions – Amendment of Law) (Jersey) Regulations 2014) to avoid “potentially straining crucial external partnerships” with specified UK authorities and to “to recognise the importance of the relationship the States of Jersey Police and the Island have with the U.K. Police Service, Security Agencies and other national bodies, which is fundamental to enable secure information-sharing”(see the Report forming part of P.162/2014).  The purpose of Article 26A was not to provide an absolute exemption for information received from Jersey authorities. 

Further, it is simply not correct to equate ECCU to any of the UK agencies specified at paragraph 2 of Article 26A.  Sub-paragraphs (a) to (j) (inclusive) and (o) do not relate to “criminal investigative agencies”.  

Sub-paragraph (k) and (l) refer to the UK’s National Criminal Intelligence Service (“NCIS”).  NCIS no longer exists; in 2006, its personnel were migrated into the Serious Organised Crime Agency (“SOCA”), which is considered further below in relation to sub-paragraph (m).  When it did exist, the function of NCIS was to gather and analyse intelligence data in order to provide insight and intelligence to national police forces

National Criminal Intelligence Service - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

​ECCU does not perform a similar function (i.e. providing intelligence to the States of Jersey Police) in Jersey. 

Sub-paragraph (m) refers to SOCA. SOCA has also closed

(National Criminal Intelligence Service - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)

SOCA was replaced by the UK’s National Crime Agency (the “NCA”), which is considered further below in relation to sub-paragraph (n).  When it did exist, SOCA was an Executive Non-Departmental Public Body, reporting to the UK's Home Secretary. SOCA provided and managed, on behalf of the UK, the Suspicious Activity Reports regime, the UK Financial Intelligence Unit, the Interpol and the Europol Bureau functions, one of the two UK Central Authorities for the European Arrest Warrant regime, the National Compromise Database and other similar roles.  Again, these functions are not similar to the functions performed in Jersey by ECCU.​ 

Sub-paragraph (n) refers to the NCA.  The UK’s NCA is a non-ministerial civil service department, operationally independent and accountable to Parliament through the Home Secretary.  In this respect, there is some similarity to Jersey’s Joint Financial Crimes Unit (the “JFCU”), which, as a police-led agency reports to the Chief Officer of the States of the Jersey Police, who is ultimately accountable to the Jersey Police Authority and Minister for Justice and Home.  In contrast, ECCU does not report to the Minister for Justice and Home; ECCU reports to the Attorney General.  

The NCA includes the UK’s Financial Intelligence Unit (equivalent to Jersey’s Financial Intelligence Unit) and UK’s National Cyber Crime Unit.  ECCU does not contain Jersey’s Financial Unit, which is entirely independent, nor does it responsible in Jersey for tackling cybercrime.  It cannot reasonably be claimed that, therefore, that the NCA’s functions are similar to those performed by ECCU.  

To the extent that ECCU may be considered to have any equivalent in the UK, it is the Serious Fraud Office (the “SFO”) (not the NCA, or any of the other agencies specified at Article 26(A) of the FOI Law).  The UK’s SFO is superintended by the UK’s Attorney General and adopts the “Roskill Model”

SFO historical background and powers - Serious Fraud Office (sfo.gov.uk)​​​

​​which ECCU also purports to have adopted (see paragraph 3.2 of the Memorandum of Understanding: Financial Crime Investigation & Criminal Asset Recovery in Jersey - available at: 

FC MOU.pdf (gov.je)

Although the SFO was in existence when Article 26A of the FOI Law was introduced (the SFO was founded in 1987), notably the SFO is not one of the UK agencies specified in Article 26A of the FOI Law.  There is therefore no automatic exemption for information supplied by, or relating to, the SFO. 

The fact that neither ECCU (nor any UK equivalent) is specified in Article 26A is itself revealing.  Far from a presumption that material handled by ECCU relates to the “national security” of Jersey, the contrary presumption applies.  Information supplied by, or relating to, ECCU is presumed not to be exempt; the onus is on the SPA to positively determine that Article 27 (or some other exemption) applies.  Any claim to withhold information provided by ECCU to a scheduled public authority on the basis of “national security” must, therefore, be subject to robust and critical scrutiny. 

Article 27

Article 27(1) of the FOI Law provides that information which does not fall within Article 26A(1) is absolutely exempt information if an exemption from the obligation to disclose it is required to safeguard national security. 

The Internal Review Panel is invited to bear in mind that the application of Article 27 in Jersey is truly exceptional.  A search of prior Freedom of Information responses in Jersey indicates that, in the 13 years since the FOI Law was introduced, Article 27 has previously only been relied on to withhold information on 6 occasions: (1) a request for Emergency Plans; (2) a request for information about terrorism related arrests; (3) a request for information about police resourcing, counter terrorism and armed officers; (4) a request about the types of firearms and ammunition used by the States of Jersey and Police; (5) a request about vessels stopped by Police of Customs and Immigration; and (6) a request about security measures.  The majority of the instances where Article 27 has previously been relied on to withhold information relate to instances where it was deemed necessary to protect Jersey against terrorism; none relate to information supplied by, or relating to, ECCU (or financial crime). 

In order for information to be exempt on the basis of Article 27, it is not sufficient for the information simply to relate to national security. Nor is it sufficient for it to be useful or desirable to withhold the information. In order for information to be properly withheld on the basis of Article 27, it must be determined that withholding that information is “required” to safeguard national security. 

As the Response notes, “required” has been interpreted as meaning “reasonably necessary” and there must be “a real possibility of an adverse effect” (emphasis added). 

Accordingly, Article 27 can only be relied on to withhold the Manual, in its entirety, if it can be reasonably determined that disclosing all of the information is the Manual is reasonably necessary to prevent a real possibility of an adverse effect on the national security of Jersey.  

The internal reviewers are requested to carefully scrutinise the SPA’s bold conclusion that there is a real possibility of an adverse effect on the national security of Jersey if all of the information in the Manual is disclosed. 

In apparent support of this conclusion, the Response states: “the more readily accessible to criminals one can make a detailed understanding of matters such as that covered by the [Manual], the more likely it is such criminals could use such knowledge to avoid successful investigations (in turn leading to a greater chance of damage and harm occurring to Jersey’s citizens and economy).” 

It appears to be being suggested in the Response, therefore, that, if the Manual is made publicly available, there is a real possibility that: (a) criminals will read the Manual; (b) by reading the Manual, criminals will be able to acquire knowledge that will enable them to avoid successful investigations in Jersey; (c) criminals will use the knowledge obtained to avoid successful investigations in Jersey; and (d) this will harm Jersey’s citizens and economy. 

It is submitted that such a suggestion is fanciful.  It is implausible to suggest that the Manual could contain information so sensitive that, if a criminal read it, there would be a real possibility of a criminal avoiding successful investigation in Jersey.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how any information could be so helpful to criminals.  Such a suggestion appears to give little credit to the capabilities of those in Jersey tasked with investigating money laundering.  Indeed, if correct, it would suggest that the SPA has little faith in ECCU's ability to investigate crime, if mere knowledge of the contents of the Manual would enable criminals to have a real possibility of avoiding successful investigations.  It would be surprising if the SPA does in fact hold such a belief about ECCU’s capabilities; it seems more likely that the SPA believes that Jersey’s investigative agencies are capable of carrying out successful investigations in Jersey.  Accordingly, it would appear that there is not a reasonable basis for concluding that disclosure of the Manual would enable criminals to have a real possibility of avoiding successful investigations in Jersey. 

If the Manual is published, rather than threatening Jersey's national security, this is in fact more likely to be beneficial to Jersey.  Demonstrating that ECCU has robust processes for conducting Financial Investigations is likely to act as a deterrent effect for sophisticated criminals, therefore reducing the chance of financial crime occurring in Jersey.  Publication of the Manual will also publicly demonstrate Jersey’s commitment to tackling financial crime.  Furthermore, by submitting the Manual to public scrutiny, the public will be provided with an opportunity to scrutinise its content; to the extent that defects are identified, this will be beneficial for Jersey as it will enable any such defects to be rectified.  

In the Response, the SPA entirely failed to engage with the fact that, as noted in the Request, other reputable jurisdictions have published similar guidance. Examples include the United States Department of Justice’s Financial Investigations Guide and the CARPO training manual on Financial Investigations.  If the US Department of Justice reasonably believed that publishing such guidance was a threat to national security, it would not have done so.    

Similarly, Ukraine has published its Manual on Financial Investigations, as part of a project implemented with the support of the European Union Anti-Corruption Initiative (EUACI) – see

Manual on Financial Investigations (fiu.gov.ua)

​The UK’s College of Policing has also published to the general public its advice for investigators on how to conduct a money laundering investigation: 

Working together (college.police.uk)​​

​No explanation has been provided by the SPA as to why it believes that Jersey is different to these jurisdictions and/or why the Manual, and the information contained therein, is believed to be qualitatively different to the guidance published in those jurisdictions. 

In circumstances where other jurisdictions have published similar guidance, the decision to decline to publish the Manual is in fact likely to have a detrimental effect on Jersey since, amongst other things, it will foster suspicion and concern (both domestically and internationally) about Jersey’s lack of transparency.  If the decision to withhold the Manual is upheld, it would lead to a peculiar situation where Ukraine (a country which, despite stated efforts to improve the situation, continues to be perceived as a comparatively corrupt jurisdiction) has nevertheless determined to publish its Manual in full, but Jersey has determined that it cannot do similar. 

The claim that it is required to withhold the Manual to safeguard national security can also be tested by reference to how the Manual has been treated internally by the Government of Jersey.  The Internal Review Panel is invited to examine why, if the Manual is so sensitive, it was shared by ECCU in the first place.  ECCU appears to have provided at least the SPA (the Department of Economy) with a copy. It is inferred from the fact that the Manual was specifically prepared to address one of the recommended actions (recommended action 12) of Jersey’s National Risk Assessment of Money Laundering in 2020, that a copy of the Manual has also been provided by the SPA to MONEYVAL’s representatives.  

It is submitted that it would be appropriate for the Internal Review Panel to consider in detail the relevant internal, contemporaneous, correspondence relating to the sharing of the Manual, in order to understand in what circumstances, in what manner and on what conditions (if any) the Manual was distributed (both by ECCU and, afterwards, by the SPA).  Was the Manual appropriately labelled as “classified” or similar?  Do all of individuals that received copies of the Manual have the security clearances that one would expect if there was a real possibility that releasing the content of the Manual would cause harm to Jersey’s national security?  Has the Manual been stored by the SPA using appropriately secure methods? Has the Manual been distributed to any third parties outside the Government of Jersey?  If so, is this consistent with the contention that revealing the Manual's content would harm Jersey’s national security? 

The Internal Review Panel is also requested to carefully consider whether Article 27 applies to all of the information contained in the Manual, rather than part of that information (if any).   It is submitted that Article 27 should not have been applied in a blanket fashion to the whole of the Manual.  Rather, the SPA should have considered for each part of the Manual whether or not such part of Manual is properly exempt from disclosure under Article 27.  If certain parts of the Manual do not meet the requirements of Article 27 (for example, because there is not a real possibility of an adverse effect to Jersey's national security from disclosure of those parts of the Manual), those parts of the Manual should have been disclosed, with any properly exempt parts omitted. 

Article 31 

The SPA has also sought to withhold the Manual on the basis of Article 31 of the FOI Law.  Article 31 provides that information is qualified exempt information if it is or relates to the provision of advice by the Bailiff, Deputy Bailiff or the Attorney General or the Solicitor General.  

The Internal Review Panel is requested to carefully scrutinise whether this exemption is applicable to the Manual, given that the SPA states that the Manual has been produced by legal advisers with ECCU.  The Manual has not been prepared, therefore, by the Bailiff, Deputy Bailiff, the Attorney General or the Solicitor General.  In such circumstances, it is not clear on what basis it can be properly asserted that Article 31 applies. 

The assertion (which it is submitted must also be thoroughly scrutinised by the Internal Review Panel) that the Manual constitutes “legal advice”, and is therefore privileged, is not sufficient, by itself, for the Manual to come within the exemption set out at Article 31.  Whilst there is a separate qualified exemption for legal professional privilege (Article 32), notably the SPA has not sought to rely on that exemption; the inference being that the SPA does not believe that Article 32 is applicable to the Manual. 

If it is properly determined that the Manual does constitute “advice by the Bailiff, Deputy Bailiff or the Attorney General or the Solicitor General” (which, for the avoidance of doubt, is not accepted), the Internal Review Panel must then determine whether the Attorney General has already waived the exemption.  The Response asserts that privilege was not waived when the Manual was provided to the Government Department, but this bald assertion should be tested by reference to contemporaneous records relating to its sharing (see above).  It should also be examined how (if at all) this assertion can be reconciled with any wider sharing of the Manual, such as with MONEYVAL. 

If it is properly determined that the Manual does constitute “advice by the Bailiff, Deputy Bailiff or the Attorney General or the Solicitor General" and the exemption has not yet been waived, it is submitted that the most appropriate course of action would then be to enquire whether the Attorney General consents to the exemption being waived in relation to the Manual.  In relation to Article 31, it is submitted that a decision whether to consent to the release of his advice is exercised by the Attorney General on a quasi-judicial basis; the Attorney General must stand back and consider solely, and objectively, what is the public interest. 

Furthermore, even if the exemption potentially applies and has not been waived, Article 31 is a qualified exemption only and the SPA must itself determine whether it is in the public interest to withhold the information.  

The Response appears to have given only cursory consideration to the public interest, asserting simply: “It is not in the public interest for such legal advice to be available to potential suspects or defendants in financial crime cases.” 

This assertion itself is highly questionable.  It is consistent with the rule of law, and therefore strongly in the public interest, for financial crime to be investigated and prosecuted within the confines of the law.  Financial crime in Jersey cannot be prosecuted in such a way that is contrary to the law of Jersey.  Accordingly, it is difficult to comprehend why it is in the public interest for any member of the public, whether they are potential suspects or defendants in financial crime cases or otherwise, to be denied access to a document (the Manual) which provides guidance about the law in Jersey.  If there is a concern that there are aspects of the law that might assist potential criminals in their defence, then this should not be shielded from public scrutiny; on the contrary, it should be highlighted in order that consideration may be given to amending the law; “sunlight is the best disinfectant”. 

The SPA does not appear to have properly considered any of the factors favouring disclosure.  Whilst it is recognised that there is generally a strong public interest in protecting the Attorney General’s advice, this may still be overridden in some cases if there are particularly strong factors in favour of disclosure.  If this was not the case, Article 31 would have been an absolute exemption, not a qualified one.  In the case of the Manual, it is submitted that factors that may usually be considered to weigh in favour of the information being withheld simply do not apply.  It is hard to see how it can be said that disclosing the Manual could (1) inhibit the Attorney General in future from giving frank advice, (2) inhibit government bodies in taking advice, or (3) inhibit the full disclosure to the Attorney General of material relevant to the advice.  Indeed, the inapplicability of factor 3 to these circumstances, in particular, suggests that this is simply not a case where Article 31 properly applies. 

​When considering whether it is in the public interest to withhold the information in the Manual, the SPA should considered whether it was in the public interest to disclose part, but not the whole of, the information contained in the Manual.  As with Article 27, however, the SPA appears to have neglected to give proper consideration to the possibility of disclosing the Manual with certain parts omitted (for example, through redaction).  If the Internal Review Panel determines that the Article 31 exemption potentially applies, the Internal Review Panel is requested to consider whether it may be in the public interest to disclose at least certain parts of the Manual.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, it is submitted that the Manual should not have been withheld on the basis of either Article 27 or Article 31.  Alternatively, only part (and not the whole) of the Manual should have been withheld. Accordingly, the Internal Review Panel is requested to disclose the information contained in the Manual in whole or, alternatively (if the Internal Review Panel determines that the exemptions properly apply to some of the information in the Manual) in part.

Internal Review Response

This review has been completed by two senior staff members of the Government of Jersey, independent of the original decision-making process.

The original response has been reviewed and assessed to identify whether the application of the exemption had been applied correctly and whether it was appropriate to withhold information.

The Internal Review Panel considered the commentary provided in respect of Article 26A to be helpful and well-argued.  However, it was not convinced that such analysis should alter reliance on Article 27.  The approach adopted by Ukraine or the UK’s College of Policing should not be determinative of whether an individual exemption applies in Jersey.

The Internal Review Panel was content that Article 31 applies to the information in question and that the public interest supports the information being withheld rather than disclosed (having regard to CAS-01542).

The Internal Review Panel also considered that Article 42 was engaged, with specific reference to Article 42(a) and (g).  After careful consideration, it took the view that the public interest supports the information being withheld rather than disclosed, on the basis that the Manual may contain proprietary information that should not be divulged to parties who may seek to participate in money laundering.